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V1.2.2 Benchmark  
April 02, 2004

This document is a first generation Level I Benchmark for the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system. It is a combination of best practices published by The SANS Institute, the National Security Agency, and the United States Department of Defense, plus advice from members of the Center for Internet Security (CIS).

CIS Level I Benchmarks define minimum standards for securing various operating systems including Windows, and variations of Unix. These standards should be used to improve the “out of the box” security of common operating system software to a prudent “due care” minimum level. By definition, the security actions included in CIS Level I Benchmarks satisfy three conditions: (1) they can be safely implemented by a system administrator of any level of technical security skill, (2) they will generally “do no harm” to functionality commonly required by everyday users, and (3) they can be scored by an associated software tool. This document is an example of a Level I Benchmark.

Level II Benchmarks are more detailed, and more specialized with regard to specific applications or functions running on an operating system platform. These standards may recommend or require that certain functionality be restricted in light of the associated risk. Examples of Level II Benchmarks include Internet Information Services, Terminal Services, or Microsoft SQL Server. Creating Level II Benchmarks often involves joint effort by specialists in both application and operating system security.

National Security Agency (NSA) Standards


The NSA documentation also includes security template files (.inf files) that can be used to quickly configure computer systems in accordance with their standards. They have templates available for Windows 2000 Domain Controllers, Member or Stand-Alone Servers, Workstations, Domain-wide policy, and Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server 2000. The Workstation and Server policies have been very helpful in the development of these benchmarks. (See the Practical Application section on use of .inf templates). More information from the NSA Information Systems Security Organization is available at http://www.nsa.gov/ isso/index.html.

United States Department of Defense (DOD) Standards

The Department of Defense has also taken significant steps to protect its computer-based assets. It has taken many of the industry standard security policies and modified them to be more suitable to deployable personnel. Their adaptation of the NSA standards has been instrumental in creating widely usable standard benchmarks applicable in diverse environments, such as those specified in this document.
Keeping Score

The goal of every benchmark and the associated scoring tools is to give users a point-in-time view of where systems stand in relation to the currently accepted standard. This “score” produced by the scoring tool is a number between zero and ten, and is derived from the table below.

The criteria used for scoring are divided into four categories: (1) Service Packs and Hotfixes, (2) Policies, and (3) Security Settings - each receiving one-quarter (or 2.5 out of 10) of the score, and (4) Available Services and Other System Requirements accounting for the final quarter of the score. Additional applications, or Services, may detract from the overall score, just as additional services detract from the security of these systems in the production environment. Level II Benchmarks are being developed to cover such applications.

Each of these three categories has a limited number of major requirements and many minor requirements. For example, in the area of Service Packs and Hotfixes, the current Service Pack is a major requirement, while other Hotfixes may be considered minor. The major and minor elements of each category are discussed in the following sections. The sections on Available Services and Other System Requirements have been added as a result of CIS member feedback.

As time goes on, these allocations are subject to change. This initial distribution pattern is only a starting point, and will undoubtedly be enhanced over time.
**Intended Audience**

This benchmark is intended for anyone using a Windows 2000 operating system who feels at all responsible for the security of that system. A Security Manager or Information Security Officer should certainly be able to use this guide and the associated tools to gather information about the security status of a network of Windows 2000 machines. The owner of a Small Office/Home Office can use this guide as a straightforward aid in enhancing his or her own personal network security. A Windows System Administrator can use this guide and the associated tools to produce explicit scores that can be given to management to reflect where they currently stand, versus where they should stand with regard to security.

Any user who uses this guide to make even the slightest improvement on the secure state of a system might be doing just enough to turn a potential hacker or cracker away to an easier target. If enough people become “Security Aware Users” then the safety level of the Internet will have improved dramatically.

**Practical Application**

Just as there is often no single correct way to get to a specific destination, there is more than one way to implement the settings and suggestions described in this text. In a network environment, with a Windows 2000 Active Directory Domain, Group Policy can be used to apply nearly all the settings described herein. Many surveys of Fortune 500 or Fortune 1000 companies have indicated that large companies have hesitated to migrate to Active Directory because of the level of complexity involved. Once an infrastructure has been implemented to support an Active Directory domain, implementing most of these policies with Group Policy becomes relatively easy.

Until Active Directory prevails over the existing domain infrastructures, administrators and users are forced to use the Local Security Policy editor of individual Member Servers and Workstations to lock down their environment.

The information contained in this text applies equally well to Local Security Policies as to Group Policies. In a large domain infrastructure, Group Policy can (and should) be set to override the Local Security Policy. Anyone attempting to make modifications to the Local Security Policy, which seem to “mysteriously disappear” should contact their system administrator, or their management to see if Group Policy may be overriding their changes.

The actions required to “harden” a Windows 2000 operating system will be described in terms of updating the Local Security Policy. The Local Security Policy editor, as well as many other tools used herein, is located in the Administrative Tools menu. In some cases, clicking the Start button, and then looking under Programs will be enough. Otherwise, click Start, Settings, and open the Control Panel. Double-click the Administrative Tools icon in the Control Panel to find the Local Security Policy Editor. **(A method involving the use of the Microsoft Configuration and Analysis Utility, to automatically install the cis.inf template which includes the security settings contained in this benchmark, is described in documentation that accompanies the CIS W2K scoring tool.)**
Service Pack and Hotfix Requirements:

Microsoft periodically distributes large updates to its operating systems in the form of Service Packs, as often as once every few months, or less frequently. Service Packs include all major and minor fixes up to the date of the service pack, and are extensively tested by Microsoft prior to release. In light of the vast number of applications available, it is entirely possible that a bug in a Service Pack may not be discovered, and may slip through this engineering analysis process. Service Packs should be used in a test environment before being pushed into production. If a test system is not available, wait a week or two after the release of a Service Pack, and pay attention to the Microsoft web site for potential bug reports. Additional mailing list and Internet resources are listed in the appendices of this document.

Between the releases of Service Packs, Microsoft distributes intermediate updates to their operating systems in the form of Hotfixes. These updates are usually small and address a single problem.

Hotfixes can be released within hours of discovery of any particular bug or vulnerability, because they address a single problem. Since they are normally released so quickly, they do not pass the rigorous testing involved with Service Packs. They should be used with caution at first, even more so than Service Packs. Each Hotfix includes a description of the issue it resolves, whether it is security related, or it fixes a different sort of problem. These should be weighed to determine if the risk of installing the Hotfix is worth the risk of not installing it.

Periodically, Microsoft will release a Hotfix “Roll-up” which is medium ground between a Hotfix and a Service Pack.

It is important to be aware that Service Packs and Hotfixes are not just applicable to operating systems. Individual applications have their own Service Pack and Hotfix requirements. A Windows 2000 system that is completely current on Windows 2000 Hotfixes and Service Packs also needs to be kept current with Service Packs and Hotfixes for Internet Explorer and MS Office. The total security of the system requires attention to both Operating System and application levels.

Major Service Pack and Hotfix Requirements:

Microsoft originally intended to release Service Packs for its Windows NT-based operating systems as often as once each quarter. This goal has proven to be logistically infeasible, and Service Packs are currently released as necessary. Microsoft has historically required that computers be updated to the current Service Pack before offering detailed technical support. A link to obtain the current Service Pack is available in Appendix A.
**Minor Service Pack and Hotfix Requirements:**

Hotfixes are not released on a schedule. They are produced as new bugs and vulnerabilities are discovered. There is a link to the available Hotfixes for Windows 2000 in Appendix A at the end of this document.

The process of discovering which hotfixes are needed has been automated since the release of Windows 2000. Open Internet Explorer, click the Tools drop-down menu, and click “Windows Update”. Click the link to Product Updates. When asked if you trust Microsoft, say yes in order to proceed. Windows update will take a few moments and analyze your system, and identify the Critical Updates and Service Packs, Advanced Security Updates, Recommended Updates, and Device Driver updates which are available, including updates to Internet Explorer.

The Critical Updates and Service Packs, and Advanced Security Updates must be installed for the score of this benchmark. Some updates must be installed individually, while others may be installed in batches before a reboot is required. If your system is running Internet Information Services, you will be given shown updates for IIS as well. Some of these updates are rather large, and should be installed over a high-speed connection if available.
Auditing and Account Policies

While many system attacks take advantage of software inadequacies, many also make use of user accounts on a Windows computer. In order to prevent this sort of vulnerability, “policies” or rules define what sort of account/password “behavior” is appropriate, and what auditing behavior is required. The configuration of user account policies is inadequate or disabled in a default installation.

Account Policies answer questions like “How often do I need to change my password?” or “How long or how complex does my password need to be?” These policies are often left disabled or weak, leaving many machines vulnerable to attack with little or no effort.

Auditing Policies determine what sorts of security transactions are recorded in the Security Event Log. By default, nothing is retained in the Security Event Log, so any attempts to compromise a system go completely unrecorded. Logging events is crucial for analysis in the aftermath of an intrusion incident.

Major Auditing and Account Policies

There are so many important account policies, that it is difficult to pin down what the “worst offender” is, with regard to how accounts are handled. Password length and complexity are obviously important, but so is another factor that extends beyond a written policy: When accounts are created or maintained, they are often set to have passwords that never expire – overriding the accepted account policy.

The major account-related policies should be split between two factors:

- Minimum Password Length of 8 characters.
- All account passwords are no more than 90 days old.

There are arguments to be made that passwords of more than 7 characters are no more difficult to crack than passwords of exactly seven characters. While this is true for LAN Manager (LM) authentication, some other settings herein will help change that, effectively refusing any attempt at LAN Manager authentication.

Administrators are occasionally required to assign administrative accounts to services requiring extraordinary rights. In doing so, it becomes a time consuming process to change these passwords, especially across an enterprise. Just like changing the passwords of administrative “user” accounts, these administrative “service” accounts need to have their passwords changed on a regular basis.
Minor Auditing and Account Policies

Audit Policy

An Audit Policy determines what facts, or events, an individual system should remember or record. This is often the only record that a password attack has been attempted.

These events are not retained at all unless a computer is specifically configured to do so. This audit policy can record Success or Failure events within defined categories. The following types of events should be logged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Policy</th>
<th>Success, Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit Account Logon Events</td>
<td>Success, Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Account Management</td>
<td>Success, Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Directory Service Access</td>
<td>No Auditing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Logon Events</td>
<td>Success, Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Object Access</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Policy Change</td>
<td>Success, Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Privilege Use</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Process Tracking</td>
<td>No Auditing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit System Events</td>
<td>Success, Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two types of audit events can be logged: Success and Failure. In most cases, both types of events are important.

Audit Account Logon Events

The most basic event to record is an Account Logon event. Auditing failed logons can alert administrators to attempted logon compromises, and auditing successful logons can track users who have logged on to the system. These successful logons should be compared against known access times to see if accounts have been compromised.

Audit Account Management

Account Management auditing records information such as account creation, deletion, or modification of account attributes, passwords, and user rights. Success and Failure events should be logged.

Audit Directory Service Access

Directory Service Access auditing enables auditing of access to Active Directory objects, only if those objects are configured for this auditing. This setting has no bearing on non-domain controller computers.

Audit Logon Events

Enabling the “Audit Logon Events” for both success and failure records logons of service accounts and accounts related to major applications, such as Internet Information Services, SQL Server, etc. Success and Failure events should be logged.
Audit Object Access

Object Access is often one of the most misunderstood auditing categories on Microsoft operating systems. The common misconception is that if both success and failure events are recorded, the event logs will fill up immediately because it logs all access to all files. This is not the case.

If object access auditing is enabled, then the event log is ABLE to log access events ONLY if logging has been configured for a specific user on specific objects – usually files or folders. If those objects are configured to audit access of either success or failure, but the Audit Policy does not support the corresponding event type, no audit logging will occur.

Audit Policy Change

Changes to user rights, security options, or audit policies are recorded if auditing of Policy Changes is enabled. If this is not enabled, no record of those changes is retained.

Audit Privilege Use

Various user rights are assigned to users and groups. These rights are discussed in more detail in the following section. The use of these rights can be audited if this option is enabled for success and failure.

Audit Process Tracking

Each time a process is created, paused, stopped, or destroyed, an event can be generated in the Security Event Log. This option should only be enabled as an aid to application development, or in an effort to track down virus activity. In most cases, it can remain disabled for success and failure auditing.

Audit System Events

Auditing System events is very important. System events include starting or shutting down the computer, full event logs, or other security related events that have impact across the entire system. Auditing of Success and Failure events should be enabled.

Account Policy

A complete list of minimum acceptable account policies is attached below, along with a description of what each policy means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Password Policy:</th>
<th>1 Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Password Age</td>
<td>90 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Password Age</td>
<td>8 Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Password Length</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password Complexity</td>
<td>24 Remembered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Password History</td>
<td>Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store passwords using reversible encryption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account Lockout Policy</th>
<th>15 Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Account Lockout Duration</td>
<td>50 Bad Login Attempts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account Lockout Threshold (Maximum)</td>
<td>15 Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reset Account Lockout After:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Minimum Password Age

The purpose for requiring a minimum password age is to prevent users from using their favorite password until it expires, and changing their password more times than the system remembers, and cycling back to their favorite password, thus circumventing the system. Set the Minimum Password Age to at least one day.

Maximum Password Age

In order to ensure that users change passwords on a regular basis, policy must determine how long accounts are permitted to use the same password. If this is set to zero, passwords will never expire. This setting can otherwise be set up to 998 days. Any setting of 90 days or less is acceptable.

Minimum Password Length

The length of a password is one factor that determines the difficulty and time required to “crack” it. The NSA requires passwords of at least 12 characters. It is impractical for most business systems to require passwords of that length. The generally accepted standards vary between 7 or 8 character passwords. In conjunction with sufficient complexity, an 8 character minimum password length is generally difficult enough to guess or crack by “brute force” in its useful lifetime.

Passwords must meet complexity requirements

Passwords are made up of various characters, which can be broken down into four character groups. These are uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, and special characters. Requiring complex passwords will require new passwords to use characters from three of those four groups.

Complex passwords become difficult for users to remember, easier to mistype, and result in more users calling support personnel for password assistance. Requiring complex passwords also increases the time necessary to crack passwords exponentially.

An 8 character password made up of only lowercase characters has $26^8$ possible passwords. An 8 character password made up of uppercase, lowercase, and special characters (on a standard 104 key keyboard) has 95 possible keys (excluding control characters) that make for $95^8$ possible password combinations. This significant difference is a great help in preventing discovery of users’ passwords.

Password History

Passwords should be changed on a regular basis. By that same rule, users should not be permitted to use the same few passwords over and over again. The Enforce Password History setting determines how many previous passwords are stored to ensure that users do NOT cycle through regular passwords. The NSA requirement of 24 passwords remembered should be viable for public use as well.

Store password using reversible encryption for all users in the domain

Reversible encryption sounds on its surface to just be waiting to be cracked. The knee-jerk reaction is to disable such an option. Unfortunately, many downlevel clients and some aspects of Microsoft applications (IIS for one) may require this option to be
enabled. It should be disabled when possible, but this option should not be figured into the CIS scoring model.

**Account Lockout Policy**

One method of gaining access to a computer system is to keep trying to access that system from the network, using common account names, and different passwords until one works. Dictionary attacks use lists of common words as passwords in attempts to logon to a system. They are often successful against weak passwords. Brute Force attacks attempt to use every possible character combination as a password, and will always be successful given enough time.

In order to combat these attacks, an Account Lockout Policy will disable an account after a specified number of failed logins occurs during a defined period of time. That account will remain locked out for a defined period of time. Enabling lockout policies make these attacks mathematically infeasible.

**Account Lockout Duration**

The account lockout duration determines the amount of time that an account remains locked out once the number of failed logons has been reached. This should be set to at least 15 minutes.

**Account Lockout Threshold**

How many failed logons for a specific account is too many? If users get their passwords wrong too many times, they will effectively lock themselves out of their own account. This threshold should be set to no more than 50 failed logons.

**Reset Account Lockout Counter After**

The period of time failed logins are tallied should be set to at least 15 minutes. This time period determines how long after the first failed logon it should keep counting the failed logons until it reaches the lockout threshold.
How to Enable Auditing Policies

In order to enable Auditing Policies on the local computer, open the Local Security Policy editor (as described in the section titled “Practical Application”). In the left pane, expand the “Local Policies” and click on the “Audit Policy”. Double-click each setting in the right pane to enable auditing for each of the types of auditing desired.

In an Active Directory domain, policy settings are determined by the application of “Group Policy” settings at different levels within the domain. The application of Group Policy is beyond the scope of this Level One Benchmark, but will undoubtedly be the subject of a future Level Two Benchmark. Many books are also available on the subject of Group Policy. Any network administrator should invest heavily in a personal education regarding Group Policy.

How to Enable Account Policies

To configure Account Policies on the local computer, open the Local Security Policy editor, and expand “Account Policies” in the left pane. Click “Password Policy” and “Account Lockout Policy” in turn, and double-click each item to make the desired changes.

As with other settings, applying this configuration in an Active Directory domain requires the use of Group Policies. System Administrators should be using Group Policy objects to enforce organizational security policies.

How to check the Security Event Log

Enabling audit policies doesn’t do much good if they are never checked. Make a point of periodically checking the Security Event Log to see what sort of things are happening in the local network environment. Open the Administrative Tools folder, and double-click the Computer Management icon. Expand the left pane to “System Tools” and then to “Event Viewer”. Click “Security” and the right pane will be filled with the most recent security events.
Security Settings

Making security related changes to the various versions of Windows NT (the predecessor of Windows 2000) often required the ability to directly edit the registry. This was a hazardous process that was not too difficult to do properly, but had the potential to cause catastrophic damage to a system if done improperly.

Fortunately, Microsoft has taken those obscure registry settings and incorporated them into the Graphical User Interface tool called the Local Security Policy editor, under “Local Policies” then under “Security Options”. This tool takes much of the guesswork and most of the risk out of the hardening process.

The associated settings and the options available are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Major Security Settings

When Microsoft made the transition from Windows 3.0 and 3.1 to Window 95 and Windows NT, many of the early networking programs used a “Null User” account to transfer data from one machine to another. A Null User is a zero length username with a zero length password. By default, it is still enabled on Windows NT and Windows 2000 machines today. This user does not have elevated rights on these computers, but it is considered a user, and still has the ability to gain information that would be valuable in the hands of an attacker.

The first setting under “Security Options” is “Additional Restrictions for Anonymous Connections”. It can be set to “None. Rely on default permissions”, “Do not allow enumeration of SAM accounts or shares”, or “No access without explicit anonymous permissions”. In order to provide minimum protection against Null User exploitation, change this to “Additional Restrictions for Anonymous Connections”. Change this setting to “Do not allow enumeration of SAM accounts or shares” for minimum acceptable protection, or to the last choice, to further protect your computer(s) from access by the Null User account.

**Warning:** Note that changing to “No access without explicit anonymous permissions” may disable older programs that make use of this account. It will also hamper Windows NT 4.0 Domain Controllers from communicating with each other between trust relationships. Personal users probably don’t have to worry about this setting, but should be wary if something doesn’t work right after it is changed. Corporate or Government users should test this in an extensive lab environment before mandating it among many computers.
**Minor Security Settings**

**Allow Server Operators to Schedule Tasks**

On Domain Controllers (and only on Domain Controllers,) only Administrators are permitted to access the Task Scheduler. This option can be enabled in order to delegate low level tasks to Server Operators. On servers and workstations, it can remain undefined.

**Allow System to be Shut Down Without Having to Log On**

By default, Windows 2000 Professional enables this option, and Windows 2000 Servers disable it. Whether or not this option should be changed on a computer is entirely subject to its environment. Workstations should probably keep their default settings. Servers may need to keep their default settings as well.

If a server is in a guarded Data Center, it will need rebooted periodically. In some cases, it may be more prudent to allow the server to be rebooted from the console without logging in, as opposed to giving data center operators rights to the machines themselves. This setting does not apply to benchmark scoring, but judgment must be applied and documented in individual security policies.

**Amount of Idle Time Required Before Disconnecting Session**

How long should the system wait until inactive sessions are disconnected? This setting is probably application dependent. Some application servers, like Terminal Servers, are likely to require longer inactive session thresholds than others, like IIS. Set this value to no more than the default setting of 15 minutes.

**Disable CTRL+ALT+DEL Requirement for Logon**

One of the strengths of Windows security is that it requires the CTRL+ALT+DEL key sequence to log on to a computer. Disable this option.

**LAN Manager Authentication Level**

There are four types of network communication involved in Windows NT/2000 authentication: LAN Manager (or LM), NT LAN Manager (or NTLM), and NTLM v2 and Kerberos. LM communication is the easiest to crack because of the way it is stored. NTLMv2 is the hardest to crack because it was developed from lessons learned over time, and uses better cryptography. Unfortunately, either (or both) of these types of network communication are passed to a client in response to network requests. Kerberos authentication surpasses all of these methods of communication, but is only applicable within an Active Directory domain.

Change this option to “Send NTLMv2 Response Only” at a minimum. Changing it to “…refuse LM” or “…refuse LM and NTLM” significantly enhances the security of the information transmitted over a network.

In order to enable NTLM and NTLMv2 protocols for these legacy operating systems, they must have installed the Directory Services Client (DSCLIENT.EXE) from Microsoft. The Internet address for more information on the Directory Services client is available in Appendix A.
Message Text for Users Attempting to Log On

There have been court cases where system intruders have eluded conviction by claiming they were never “warned” not to access a system which is private property. In response, Microsoft has enabled a log-on notice (and the corresponding logon title, next) to allow system administrators to display a legal notice prior to users logging on.

The warning banner should vary from one organization to another, and should not be implemented without legal counsel. Here is a sample message, which should give users an idea of what to expect: “This system is for the use of authorized users only. Individuals using this computer system with authority, without authority, or in excess of their authority, are subject to having all of their activities on this system monitored and recorded by system personnel. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using this system, or in the course of system maintenance, the activities of authorized users may also be monitored. Anyone using this system expressly consents to such monitoring and is advised that if such monitoring reveals possible evidence of criminal activity, system personnel may provide the evidence of such monitoring to law enforcement officials.” This text has been taken from CERT Advisory CA-1992-19 as quoted from http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/incident/evidence.htm.

Message Title for Users Attempting to Log On

Related to the Message Text, the Message Title should be set according to individual legal advice, but should be set to something similar to “Warning: This is a monitored computer system!”

Prevent Users from Installing Printer Drivers

It is feasible for “Trojan Horse” types of programs to be disguised as printer drivers, which seem to be necessary for users to print, but actually do something else malicious. If only administrators are able to install printer drivers, there is no fear that the unsuspecting user will compromise his or her computer by installing unreliable drivers. Enable this option.

Prompt User to Change Password Before Expiration

How many days before a password expires should the system prompt a users as he or she logs on? The default value of 14 days is recommended, but at least 7 days is required.

Recovery Console: Allow Automatic Administrative Logon

One of the tools new to Windows 2000 is the idea of a Recovery Console. It is available by pressing the F8 key during the boot sequence. The Recovery Console gives limited access to the root folder of each volume, and the Windows system folders. It does not give unrestricted access to a system. By default, it requires the password of the Local Administrator account. Many System Administrators do not keep track of the password to this account (because it should not be used regularly) so they may be tempted to enable this option.

This option should be disabled as a rule. The only circumstance where this may not be the case is one where the physical security of a machine is not vaguely in question. If this option is enabled, and the computer is stolen, or can be rebooted casually, the contents may be compromised.
Recovery Console: Allow Floppy Copy and Access to All Drives and All Folders

By default, access via the Recovery Console is restricted to the root folder of each volume, and the Windows system folders. No Data may be copied from the hard disks to the floppy drive. Enabling this option allows relatively unrestricted access to an entire system. It should be disabled, but due to its convenience, it is not required for a Level 1 Benchmark.

Rename Administrator Account

In order to gain access to a computer system, a prospective user needs a user account and a password. The default name of a valid account on every Windows computer is “Administrator”. Hackers know this, and it is one of the things they try. As a matter of policy, this account should be renamed – to anything other than Administrator. The choice of account names should vary from location to location, so long as it has been changed.

Please be aware that this is not a “silver bullet” against finding the Administrator account. Experienced hackers who have already found a foothold in a local network will be able to discover the account name very quickly. However, this CAN help defend against “scripted” attacks.

Take care when renaming the Administrator account. Some applications, enterprise management systems in particular, can be “broken” when this account is renamed, even though those applications don’t actually authenticate against this account. Test this setting extensively before implementing it in large numbers.

Rename Guest Account

Just like the Administrator account above, rename the Guest account to something less obvious. This will not be an issue as long as the Guest account remains disabled, but it’s a good idea to change it anyway.

Restrict CD-ROM Access to Locally Logged-On User Only

It is potentially possible for a CD-ROM to be shared like any other part of a Windows file system. Enable this option to prevent users from sharing the local CD-ROM Drive. This setting is no longer required for the Windows 2000 Level 1 Benchmark.

Restrict Floppy Access to Locally Logged-On User Only

As with the above setting, Enable this option to restrict access to the local floppy drive to the local user only. This setting is no longer required for the Windows 2000 Level 1 Benchmark.

Secure Channel: Require Strong (Windows 2000 or later) Session Key

This describes the type of session key required to sign or encrypt the Secure Channel session. While enabling this option would provide stronger encryption, it also requires more resources to encrypt data with a strong key. Since Windows 2000 Service Pack 2 is only available with high (128 bit) encryption, this option should be enabled.
Send Unencrypted Password to Connect to Third-Party SMB Servers

This option could enable a non-Windows computer to ask for – and receive – an unencrypted password because they are unable to process Windows password hash values. This option should be disabled.

Strengthen Default Permissions of Global System Objects (e.g. Symbolic Links)

Windows 2000 keeps a list of shared objects and their default Access Control Lists. The “strengthened” setting for these Access Control Lists allow users read access to all users’ shared objects, and full access to their own.

This option is enabled by default, and it should remain so.

Unsigned Driver Installation Behavior

Microsoft has generally shipped drivers with a digital signature, expressing that Microsoft itself has certified the drivers as valid, and tested not to perform actions that constitute foul play. Unfortunately, not all drivers (even from Microsoft) are shipped with digital signatures. These settings should be set to anything other than silent success. If a user or administrator attempts to install unauthenticated drivers, they should at least receive a warning against such action. This setting should read “Warn, but allow installation” or “Do Not Allow Installation”.

Unsigned Non-Driver Installation Behavior

According to Microsoft, there are no “Non-Driver” devices to install. This setting has no effect.
Available Services

Each and every computer that responds to network requests has an application or service that answers requests on that network. The more types of network requests that have services answering them, the more potential portals exist for attack. If a service is not being used, it should be disabled or removed. If it is to be used, it should be properly secured and maintained. To determine which services you have running on your system, and to disable any unneeded services, click Start, Settings, Control Panel, Administrative Tools, and Services.

Securing applications running on Windows 2000 computers as Services, such as Internet Information Server, DNS Server, SQL Server, and hundreds of others, is beyond the scope of this, or any Level I Benchmark. The Center for Internet Security will be developing Level II Benchmarks to provide guidelines for these situations.

Check the CIS web site (http://www.cisecurity.org) to see what other benchmarks are available or in development. CIS Members can also voice an opinion on application benchmark development.

Service Status

To view the list of services installed on any given computer, log on to the console. Right-click “My Computer” and click Manage. Expand “Services and Applications” and click Services. Double-click individual services listed in the right pane to make changes to their configuration.

The normal status of a service is ‘Started’ or ‘Stopped’. In addition, services can be ‘Paused’, ‘Starting’ or ‘Stopping’. If a service status is blank, it is stopped.

It is also useful to note the “Startup Type” of a service. ‘Automatic’ services start when the computer reboots. ‘Manual’ services can be started by users or other services, but are not started automatically. Services can also be ‘Disabled’ and will not start. The Startup Type can be changed, but that requires more permissions than just starting or stopping the services.

Service Permissions

Alteration of service permissions is no longer a requirement of the Windows 2000 Level 1 Benchmark.

Warning: Disabling services without understanding what each of them do can make a system unstable or entirely unusable! Not all services are optional. Be careful which services you change.

It is also important to note that some of these services perform functions that users have become accustomed to. When disabling these services, disable one or two at a time, and restart the computer. If you have not lost any functionality, and are comfortable with these changes, move on to the remaining services. In some cases, these services are necessary for some environments. Testing may be required to get a balance between security and functionality.
Alerter

The Alerter service makes it possible for Windows 2000 computers to “alert” each other of problems. This feature goes largely unused in most circumstances. Disable the Alerter service.

Clipbook

The Clipbook service is used to transfer clipboard information from one computer to another. It is used in Terminal Services, but for stand-alone computers is rarely utilized. Disable the Clipbook service.

Fax Service

The Fax service sends and receives faxes. It is largely unused. Set the Fax service to “manual” startup. It should only be seen as “running” as faxes are actually being sent or received.

Messenger

The Messenger service works in conjunction with the Alerter service. Disable the Messenger service.

NetMeeting Remote Desktop Sharing

NetMeeting users have the option to share their desktops, and allow other NetMeeting users to control their workstation. While this is a great idea, and Microsoft has taken some steps to protect against exploiting this service, it is also a system compromise waiting to happen. Disable this service.

Telnet

The Telnet service allows a remote user to connect to a machine using a command prompt. It still requires authentication, but does not offer any encryption or security. Disable the Telnet service. If there is a legitimate need for a remote DOS console on a Windows machine, investigate third-part Secure Shell (SSH) utilities instead.

Additional Services

Services run on a computer to perform a function. It is important to know that each service running on any Windows computer has the ability to make use of system resources – processor, memory, disk usage, and so on. One of those resources is the ability to communicate over a network, or the Internet.

No system security plan can be effective unless the active services are defined and action is taken to harden, and/or disable those services. Most applications that run on a computer run as services, and provide a desired functionality. If they are not properly maintained, they may also act as a window of access for an unwelcome guest, regardless of the score generated on a Level 1 Benchmark.

It is not possible to list all of the services that can be installed on a Windows 2000 computer. The “standard” services that are normally found on a Windows computer are listed below. These services are not all as “secure” as they should be, but they are not
restricted, either because doing so would “break” common functions, or because the skill level required is beyond what would be expected for a Level 1 Benchmark.

The assessment tool provided by CIS lists the services currently installed on your machine as it executes, and identifies services outside the list below. These may or may not present a security risk. Take the time to compare these two lists, and find what services may be making your machine vulnerable.

Alerter
Application Management
Clipbook
COM+ Event System
Computer Browser
DHCP Client
Distributed Transaction Coordinator
Distributed Link Tracking Client
DNS Client
Event Log
Fax Service
Indexing Service
Infrared Monitor
Internet Connection Sharing
IPSEC Policy Agent
Logical Disk Manager
Logical Disk Manager Administrative Service
Messenger
Net Logon
NetMeeting Remote Desktop Sharing
Network Connections
Network DDE
Network DDE DSDM
NT LM Security Support Provider
Performance Logs and Alerts
Plug and Play
Print Spooler
Protected Storage
QoS RSVP
Remote Access Auto Connection Manager
Remote Access Connection Manager
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Locator
Remote Registry Service
Removable Storage
Routing and Remote Access
RunAs Service
Security Accounts Manager
Server
Smart Card
Smart Card Helper
System Event Notification
Task Scheduler
TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Service
Telephony
Telnet
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Utility Manager
Windows Installer
Windows Management Instrumentation
Driver Extensions
Windows Time
WMDM PMSP Service
Workstation

It is important to know that even if a machine scores a perfect 10 on a Level 1 Benchmark, an improperly configured service can present a vulnerability that bypasses ALL other system security. There are a large number of vulnerabilities to Internet Information Services that emphasize this fact. Other services can be just as vulnerable. You are advised to contact software manufacturers for security information on other services installed on your system. Due to the vast number of services that may be installed on your system, we are unable to address them all here.

The Center for Internet Security is committed to addressing these vulnerabilities. As time and resources allow, we will develop Level 2 Benchmarks to address many of these applications. The CIS members have the greatest input on which benchmark
standards are addressed in which order. We are continually reviewing and revising existing benchmarks, as well as developing new ones based on feedback we receive.
Other System Requirements

Windows has been innovative, easy to use, and generally flexible. It has not been easy to secure. The preceding chapters represent many of the centrally-located improvements in Windows based security.

While Windows has shown great improvement in the overall security process, there is still no “one source” to answer all security concerns of a system. Some of these settings or actions fall into the “other” category. Many of those security requirements are described below.

Ensure All Disk Volumes Are Using the NTFS File System

**Warning:** Do not do this if your system is a dual-boot system with Windows 95/98/Me – that is if you have the option of booting into Windows 2000 or Windows 9x. The alternate operating system will cease to function, and can not be recovered.

Since the early days of DOS, files have been stored on floppy disks. These disks break up data into blocks, and those blocks are written to similar blocks on a physical disk. The “map” describing which blocks are holding which files is stored on part of the disk called the “File Allocation Table” or FAT. When DOS moved to Hard Disks, the same FAT style of disk allocation was used. FAT filesystems had some good points – most of all, it’s pretty simple. Any system could read the disks, and if there was a problem, the data could have been restored. When disks began to grow beyond the size of FAT’s capabilities, it was expanded to FAT32, allowing for larger disks. However, FAT and FAT32 do not offer any security.

Along came Windows NT, which allowed the user to stick with the FAT hard disks, or use NTFS (NT File System) disks. NTFS offered the ability to assign permissions, or rights, to files and folders that could permit or deny access to those objects. In order for system administrators to use NTFS, they had to abandon FAT completely, which meant they gave up the “ease of use” and general interoperability that accompanied it. As a result, some implementations still use the FAT filesystem.

NTFS interoperability has come a long way since its initial introduction. It can be bypassed if the system can be rebooted, but it is the ONLY way that any file-level security can be enforced while system is operating.

To determine if a disk volume is NTFS, double click “My Computer” on the desktop. Right-click the C drive (C:) and click Properties. The properties pane for that disk will describe the “File System” as either FAT or NTFS.
In order to make a FAT disk into an NTFS disk, open a Command Prompt (Click Start -> Programs -> Accessories -> Command Prompt) and type “Convert C: /fs:ntfs”. The system will probably be required to restart to perform this task. Take the same action with the D: drive and any others that show up as FAT disks.

Once the disks have been converted to the NTFS file system, default security must be applied to the boot drive (C:). Open a command prompt (click Start, Programs, Accessories, and Command Prompt) and type the following command for workstations:

```
secedit /configure /db default.sdb /cfg %windir%\inf\defltwk.inf /areas filestore
```
or the following command for servers:

```
secedit /configure /db default.sdb /cfg %windir%\inf\defltsv.inf /areas filestore
```
and press enter. The /db parameter is required, even though the database does not exist until after the command is run. Type “secedit /?” for more information on this command.

Other applications will have the ability to use these security features. Most users never need to update these file permissions, while system administrators of all levels will need to do so from time to time. In fact, it is possible to cripple a system by incorrectly modifying that security. It is important to keep in mind that this is still a step up from a FAT filesystem with NO security.
Appendix A: Internet Resources

The Center for Internet Security – http://www.cisecurity.org
The SANS Institute – http://www.sans.org
Department of Defense recommendations – not currently available online.
Microsoft Directory Services Client for Windows 9x/Me -
The CIS Scoring Tool that accompanies this document uses the Microsoft Network
  Security Hotfix Checker (HfNetChk), which is licensed to Microsoft by Shavlik
  Technologies – http://www.shavlik.com/
Windows NT Magazine article regarding editing the Registry -
Appendix B: User Rights Assignment

Windows computers reference which users or accounts have rights to perform specific functions by modifying User Rights. These rights are detailed below. This list table of user rights is quoted from the SANS Institute Windows 2000 Security: Step-by-Step book.

Modifying or “tweaking” user rights to appropriately fit a computer and its environment is an advanced security topic. No modification of User Rights is required for a Level 1 Benchmark. This information is included only as a recommendation, and to provide information, not as a requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User Right</th>
<th>Possible Problems</th>
<th>Domain Controller</th>
<th>Standalone/Member Server</th>
<th>Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access this computer from the network</td>
<td>Stolen administrator accounts can be used over the network. Removing the right from the administrator accounts forces these users to have physical access to the system in order to access resources.</td>
<td>Domain Users (remove Administrators from this right)</td>
<td>Domain Users</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act as part of the operating system</td>
<td>Acting as part of the operating system overrides all other rights, permissions, or privileges.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add workstations to the domain</td>
<td>Users with this right could add another domain controller to the network and obtain a copy of the SAM database.</td>
<td>Administrators Custom**</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup files and directories</td>
<td>Users with no permissions for certain files or folders can make backup copies. When combined with the Restore Files and Directories right, this right can allow unauthorized users to obtain copies of critical files.</td>
<td>Backup Operators</td>
<td>Backup Operators</td>
<td>Backup Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bypass traverse checking</td>
<td>Allows access to files or folders regardless of the user’s permissions to the parent folder. In other words, prevents the inheritance of permissions.</td>
<td>Administrators, Server Operators, and Backup Operators</td>
<td>Administrators (&quot;Users” seems to be required for IIS)</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators and Power Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change system time</td>
<td>Resetting the system time can seriously impact or destroy audit trails.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators and Power Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System time can effectively disable Kerberos security.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a pagefile</td>
<td>Allows the creation of a security access token. This right should never be</td>
<td>Domain Admins</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>given to any user.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a token object</td>
<td>Allows the user to debug other processes and threads. Users with this right</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>could modify programs to run malicious code.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create permanent shared objects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debug programs</td>
<td>Allows the user to debug other processes and threads. Users with this right</td>
<td>None (except</td>
<td>None (except</td>
<td>None (except in off-Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>could modify programs to run malicious code.</td>
<td>in off-Internet development)</td>
<td>in off-Internet development)</td>
<td>development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny access to this computer from the</td>
<td>By denying Administrators access to Domain Controllers over the network they</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>network *</td>
<td>are forced to log on locally to make administrative changes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon as a batch job *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon as a service *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny logon locally *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable computer and user accounts to be</td>
<td>Shared file servers use this right in conjunction with the Encrypting File</td>
<td>Use this right</td>
<td>Use this right</td>
<td>Use this right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trusted for delegation *</td>
<td>System.</td>
<td>only if testing</td>
<td>only if testing</td>
<td>only if testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reveals it is</td>
<td>reveals it is</td>
<td>reveals it is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>necessary.</td>
<td>necessary.</td>
<td>necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force shutdown from a remote system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate security audits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase quotas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase scheduling priority</td>
<td>This allows a user to increase the priority of a process. Setting a process's priority too high, can consume system resources creating a denial of service attack.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load and unload device drivers</td>
<td>Granting this right to a user could allow a Trojan Horse device driver to be loaded.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock pages in memory</td>
<td>A user could use this right to launch a denial of service attack.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log on as a batch job</td>
<td>The user could log on as a service with full control of the system. Some accounts, such as virus scanners, require this right and should be closely monitored.</td>
<td>Replicators</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log on as a service</td>
<td>Known security bugs (such as GetAdmin) can escalate users permissions if run from the local console.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log on locally</td>
<td>Allows viewing and clearing of the audit logs. An attacker could clear the security log to erase evidence of the attack.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage auditing and security log</td>
<td>Environment variables can be modified to point to malicious programs.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modify firmware environment values</td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile single process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile system performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove computer from docking station *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace a process level token</td>
<td>A user with this right could replace a security access token of a process with a different token.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore files and directories</td>
<td>Users with this right can restore files regardless of their permissions. If a user has both the Backup and Restore rights, the user could backup a malicious file from one location and use it to overwrite critical system files or to plant a backdoor. In high security environments, the Backup and Restore rights should not be given to the same users. In many systems, however, this is not a viable solution.</td>
<td>Backup Operators, or create a custom “Restore Operators” group.</td>
<td>Backup Operators, or create a custom “Restore Operators” group.</td>
<td>Backup Operators, or create a custom “Restore Operators” group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shut down the system</td>
<td>Users could bring the system down in the middle of critical jobs or while users are accessing system resources.</td>
<td>Administrators and Server Operators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Authenticated Users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronize directory service data *</td>
<td>Not used in the initial release of Windows 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take ownership of files or other objects</td>
<td>A user that can take ownership of files or objects can then modify the permissions to give him/herself full access.</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* New to Windows 2000

** A custom group for Desktop Support Personnel should be created. This right can potentially be dangerous, but needs to be expanded beyond just administrators to be functional in a domain.
Appendix C: Change History

November 6, 2001 – Version 1.0 released.

January 24, 2002 – Version 1.1.0 released.
Increased minimum password length from 7 to 8.
Added chapter on Available Services.
Added chapter on Other System Requirements.
Updated scoring to reflect new chapters.
Added service permissions to requirements.
Changed references to reflect that Major Hotfix and Service Pack requirement is to install the current service pack, rather than explicitly stating SP2.

April 1, 2002 – Version 1.1.6 released.
Added link in Appendix A.

April 22, 2002 – Version 1.1.7 release.
Removed reference to NoLMHash because it is irreversible.

August 13, 2003 – Version 1.18 Released.
Modified to reflect new Terms of Use.

October 10, 2003 – Version 1.2.0 released.
Lowered RestrictAnonymous requirement to 1 (minimum) because 2 is unsupported.
Relaxed account lockout settings due to user feedback.

October 15, 2003 – Version 1.2.1 released.
Removed requirements to restrict CD and Floppy drives to the locally logged-on user.
Removed service permission requirements.

Reworded “Additional Restrictions for Anonymous Connections” description.